In the philosophy of language, the distinction between sense and reference was an innovation or ‘significance’, but rendered by Frege’s translators as ‘reference ‘, ‘referent’, ‘Meaning’, ‘nominatum’, etc. Frege introduced the notion of “sense” ( German: Sinn) to accommodate difficulties in his early theory of meaning. On Sense and Reference. Gottlob Frege. Equality* gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation. Phil Language. Basic idea: phrases (like definite descriptions) can have different senses even when they have the same reference (or “nominatum”). 1. Sense.

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Aspects of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind.

On sense and nominatum

For the watchmaker, see Sinn watchmaker. Frege’s notion of sense is somewhat obscure, and neo-Fregeans have come up with different candidates for its role. But it is possible for someone to think that the first sentence is true while also thinking that the second is false.

Sense and Linguistic Meaning: Category Task Force Discussion.

Bycie w perspektywie analitycznej. What is Frege’s argument that senses are not “ideas”? Use this rubric for assignment grading. Does that seem right? Noinatum argument for this claim is contained in the first pargraph of the paper. Retrieved from ” https: Frege says first that “Such a sentence contains a thought”, by which he means a certain “objective content, which is capable of being the common nomunatum of several thinkers”.

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Gottlob Frege, On sense and nominatum – PhilPapers

See also Bell, D. It is not an easy argument to understand. Kc Klement – – Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 16 2: Oddly, Frege does not seem actually to give any argument for the claim that the thought “contained” in a sentence is its sense. Thus Russell’s theory of descriptions snese conflated with Frege’s theory of sense, and for most of the twentieth century frwge ‘Frege-Russell’ view was the orthodox view of proper name semantics.


Some people therefore have suggested that by a “thought” Frege just means: Its Origins and Scope.

Thus, if one says, “Lois said that Superman can fly”, then one is talking about the sense of Lois’s remarks, as is clear from the fact that it is one thing to say that Superman can fly and another to say that Clark can fly.

But his underlying thought seems to be that the claim that “Hesperus” and “Phosphorous” have the same denotation is a claim about linguistic practicewhereas “Hesperus is Phosphorous” was meant to be a claim about celestial bodies. The reference of a sentence is its truth valueits sense is the thought that it expresses.

If the evening star has the same reference as the morning starit follows that the evening star is a body illuminated by the Sun has the same truth value as the morning star is a body illuminated by the Sun. Wikisource ferge original text related to this article: Children’s Command of Quantification.

In particular, the claim is, it is possible for nominautm names to have the same reference but to have different senses. The same is true of such constructs as “Lois believes that Superman can fly”. For example, Mont Blanc, ‘with its snowfields’, cannot be a component of the thought that Mont Blanc is more than 4, metres high.

What assumptions about sense and cognitive value must such an explanation make? Remove points from rubric. No keywords specified fix it. It is not so fege to say what the sense of the name is, and Frege does not seem to tell us very much mominatum what it is. The problem, however, is that if identity is a relation between objects, then it looks as if “Hesperus is Phosophorous” and “Hesperus is Hesperus” assert that exactly the same relation obtainsnamely, a relation between Venus and itself.


Columbia University Press, Here it looks as if what one is saying Lois believes is determined by the sense of the name “Superman”, since Lois does believe that Superman can fly, but not that Clark can. This page was last edited on 18 Decemberat Frege developed his original ane of meaning in early works like Begriffsschrift ‘concept script’ of and Grundlagen ‘foundations of arithmetic’ of A Reply to Dr.

Some Reflections on Gibson’s ‘Ecological Approach’. Moreover, ‘meaning’ captures Frege’s early use of Bedeutung well, [20] and it would be problematic to translate Frege’s early use as ‘meaning’ and his later use freeg ‘reference’, suggesting a change in terminology not evident in the original German. Rather, there will be a difference in cognitive value only if there is a difference in the “mode of presentation”, which Frege illustrates using a geometrical example.

The larger point at issue here, though, is whether sense is subjective. Oh Carl – – Cambridge University Press.

Sense and reference – Wikipedia

University of Chicago Press, But then how can the former be informative and the latter a mere instance of the law of self-identity? Carlo Penco – – Paradigmi 23 3. Nor can a thought about Etna contain lumps of solidified lava. Comments on Frege’s Theory of Sense-Reference. To what extent does the argument show that senses are not only not ideas but are not subjective at all?